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CLIMBING THE WALLS OF YOUR
ELECTRONIC CAGE

Steven Hetcher*
CODE: AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE. By Lawrence Lessig.
New York: Basic Books. 1999. Pp. xii, 297. Cloth, $30; paper, $15.
Space. The final frontier. Not so, say the doyennes of the first
generation Internet community, who view themselves as the new fron
tiersmen and women staking out a previously unexplored territory cyberspace. Numerous metaphors in the Internet literature picture
cyberspace as a new, previously unexplored domain. Parallels are fre
quently drawn to the American colonies, the Western frontier, or
outer space. In Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace, Lawrence
Lessig1 says, "Cyberspace is a place. People live there."2 In this place,
we will build a "new society" (p. 4). A sense of this background is
helpful in appraising Lessig's claims.

*
Assistant Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University School of Law. J.D., Yale; M.A.
(Public Policy), University of Chicago; Ph.D. (Philosophy), University of
Illinois at Chicago - Ed. I am grateful to Lisa Bressman, Robert Brewer, John Goldberg,
Ryan Raforth, Bob Rasmussen, Don Welch, Chris Yoo, and Nick Zeppos for comments on
an earlier draft and grateful to Robert Brewer and Janet Hirt for their expert research assis
tance.
1. Currently, Jack N. and Lillian R. Berkman Professor for Entrepreneurial Legal
Studies, Harvard Law School. In the fall of 2000, Professor Lessig joins the faculty at
Stanford Law School.
2. P. 190; see also Dan Rosen, Surfing the Sento, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 213, 216
(1997) (discussing the possible "founding fathers of a new cybernation "); Luke A. Walker,
ICANN's Uniform Domain Name Displlte Resolution Policy, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 289,
289 (2000) (calling cyberspace the latest new frontier). Elsewhere Lessig has written:
While they are in that place, cyberspace, they are also here. They are at a terminal screen,
eating chips, ignoring the phone. They are downstairs on the computer, late at night, while
their husbands are asleep. They are at work, or at cyber cafes, or in a computer lab. They
live this life there, while here. And then at some point in the day, they jack out, and are only
here. They step up from the machine, in a bit of a daze; they tum around. They have re
turned.
Lawrence Lessig, The Zones of Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1403, 1403 (1996) (footnote
omitted).
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He argues that "we" need a "constitution" for cyberspace.3 This
seems reasonable, a new social compact for a new society.4
While Lessig has his legal training in the U.S. system, as a former
law clerk to Justice Antonin Scalia and a recognized American consti
tutional law scholar, in Code, he uses the word "constitution" in its
British rather than its American sense.5 For the British, a constitution
is an unwritten common understanding about fundamental social val
ues and social practices that merits institutional protection from the
vicissitudes of ordinary poiitics.6 The purview of Lessig's project, then,
is constitutional theory understood as the theory of social order, a
broader inquiry than the top-down, text-based American constitu
tional theory.7

3. See p. 5 ("We build a world where freedom can flourish not by removing from society
any self-conscious control; we build a world where freedom can flourish by setting it in a
place where a particular kind of self-conscious control survives. We build liberty, that is, as
our founders did, by setting society upon a certain constitution."). Lessig appears to use
"we " to mean both Americans and some undefined larger group: "We should understand
that we are part of a worldwide political battle; that we have views about what rights should
be guaranteed to all humans, regardless of their nationality; and that we should be ready to
press these views in this new political space opened up by the Net. " P. 205.
4. I would argue instead that we have a constitution for cyberspace already. It is the one
written on parchment and displayed at the National Archives. Things are, of course, com
plicated by the fact that the Internet is a global phenomenon. But just because a phenome
non is global does not mean that the Constitution cedes jurisdiction over those elements that
have significant impact within the United States. The Internet is revolutionary, but physical
borders still matter, and will continue to, for the foreseeable future. See Jack Goldsmith,
Regulation of the Internet: Three Persistent Fallacies, 13 CHl:.-KENT L. REV. 1119, 1124
(1998). In general, Lessig agrees that real space jurisdiction matters for cyberspace regula
tion. P. 190.
5. See p. 5 ("But by 'constitution' I don't mean a legal text.. .. Rather, as the British
understand when they speak of their constitution, I mean an architecture
not just a legal
text but a way of life - that structures and constrains social and legal power, to the end of
protecting fundamental values
principles and ideals that reach beyond the compromises
of ordinary politics. ").
-

-

6. See p. 217 ("[T]he Constitution was drawn at a time when basic architectures were
set. The framers found the laws of nature .. . they were not made by government or man. ");
see also H.L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 56-57, 88-90, 102-03 (2d ed.1994); Thomas B.
McAffee, Prolegomena to a Meaningful Debate of the "Unwritten Constitution" Thesis, 61 U.
CIN.L. REV. 107, 166 n.192 (1992) (citing J.W. GOUGH, FuNDAMENTAL LAW IN ENGLISH
CONSTITUTIONALHISTORY 174-91 (1995)).
7. Lessig speaks of code and commerce as, "[t]wo forces of social order. " P. ix; see also,
RUSSELL HARDIN, TRUST AND TRUSTWORTHINESS (forthcoming Jan. 2001); JON
ELSTER, THE CEMENT OF SOCIETY: A STUDY OF SOCIAL ORDER (1989). Lessig has been a
contributor to the new social norms legal literature, which places legal regulation within the
broader context of overall social regulation. See generally, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The Law of
the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV.L. REV. 501 (1999); Lawrence Lessig,
The Limits in Open Code: Regulatory Standards and the Future of the Net, 14 BERKELEY
TECH. L. J.759 (1999); Lawrence Lessig, Commons And Code, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.,
MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 405 (1999); Lawrence Lessig, The Zones of Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L.
REV.1403 (1996); Lawrence Lessig, Intellectual Property And Code, 11 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL
COMMENT. 635 (1996); Lawrence Lessig, Reading the Constitution in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY

e.g.,
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Lessig implores us to begin the search for a way of life in cyber
space that protects "fundamental values" (p. 6). Either we do so very
soon, he insists, or we risk locking ourselves into an architecture of
computer code that will destroy liberty,8 as a by-product of promoting
the interests of global electronic commerce.9 Given the libertarian
leanings of the Internet community,10 it is ironic, Lessig observes, that
the forces of the market, Adam Smith's invisible hand, will wield the
hammer.11 After all, it is the libertarian creed that markets create lib
erty, not destroy it. According to Lessig, the overly zealous commit
ment ta libertarianism on the part of the first-generation community
blinds them to this threat, however.
While Lessig paints a foreboding picture of the dark clouds of op
pression gathering on the online horizon, he notes as well that a
brighter future is possible.12 Code is by nature mutable and may be
used to secure a constitutional structure for cyberspace that promotes
political freedom. Lessig contends that we as a society have yet to re
alize that a choice must be made with regard to the degree of liberty
we want in cyberspace (pp. 6-7). The goal is to choose-from among
all the possible cyberspaces -the one with an architectural code that
best promises to support liberty and other fundamental values we
choose to import into cyberspace (p. 6).
Lessig goes so far as to say "[c]ode is law" (pp. 6, 59). Taken at
face value, this is an extraordinary claim, given the dominance of posi-

L.J. 869 (1996); Lawrence Lessig,
(book review).

Post Constitutionalism,

94

MICH.

L. REV. 1422 (1996)

8. See p. 6 ("[W]e see that much of the 'liberty' present at cyberspace's founding will
vanish in its future.").
9. See p. x ("[A] future of control in large part exercised by technologies of commerce,
backed by the rule of law.").
10. Lay-libertarian sentiment is aptly characterized in the following well-known phrase:
"We believe in: rough consensus and running code." P. 4. The phrase was coined by one of
the founders of the Internet, David Clark of MIT, in describing the philosophy of setting
Internet standards. See Gary C. Kessler, IETF- History, Background, and Role in Today's
Internet (visited June 22, 2000) <http://www.vtac.com!Tutorials/ietf_hx.html>. This strong
libertarian stance has the implication that a position such as Richard Epstein's would make
him a "Red." See Lawrence Lessig, Real-World Libertarians and the Net (visited June 22,
2000) <http://slate.msn.com/code/BookClub/BookClub.asp?Show=1/17/00&idMessage=4391
&idBio=139> [hereinafter Lessig, Real-World Libertarians and the Net]; Richard Epstein,
Libertarianism is not Anarchism (visited June 22, 2000) <http://slate.msn.com/code/
BookClub/BookClub.asp?Show=1/17/00&idMessage=439l&idBio=139>.
11. See p. 6 ("[T]he argument of this book is that the invisible hand of cyberspace is
building an architecture that is quite the opposite of what it was at cyberspace's birth
This book is about that change, and about how we might prevent it."); see also RUSSELL
HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 6-15 (1982) (discussing the "back of the invisible hand").
.

•

.

.

12. See p. 6 ("We can build, or architect, or code cyberspace to protect values that we
believe are fundamental, or we can build, or architect, or code cyberspace to allow those
values to disappear.").
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tivism in modern jurisprudence.13 Whatever Lessig's overall jurispru
dence of cyberspace, one thing is certain; conceiving of code as law
makes the choice of code political. Indeed, for Lessig, as for his intel
lectual forebears, code is quintessentially political.14 One of the book's
most important contributions is that it raises the basic and crucial
proposition regarding the normativity of code to a new level of sophis
tication, demonstrating the applicability of the thesis to issues of pri
vacy, speech, and other core constitutional values (pp. 109-209).
Lessig has written the first book devoted to the political theory of
computer code. "Code," as the term is used by Lessig, refers, how
ever, both to computer code - the code written by programmers and to legal code-the code written by legislators. One of the book's
leitmotifs is a comparison between the properties of computer code
and those of legal code, or, as Lessig quips, "West Coast code" versus
"East Coast code" (p. 53). The overarching similarity is that both
regulate human behavior.
The regulation of human behavior, "regulability," is a second key
topic of the book. Regulability refers to the "capacity of a govern
ment to regulate behavior within its proper reach."15 On the account
Lessig develops, there are four important regulators of behavior: law,
norms, architecture, and markets (pp. 87-89). Lessig argues that in cy
berspace, network computer architecture is a "newly powerful regula
tor" of human behavior (p. 86). Nevertheless, a full account of the so
cial order of cyberspace requires an examination of the interplay of all
four regulatory forces.
Code's main normative thesis is that we must resist the migration
toward a more regulable Internet. More specifically, Lessig argues for
a "commons" in the key architectural code of cyberspace (p. 8). This
commons will result if the application layer of the Internet is domi
nated by open source code (p. 100). Open source code is to be under
stood by contrast with closed source code. Simply understood, open
code reveals its source and closed code does not. Because open code
13. See generally Jules L. Coleman, Negative and Positive Positivism, 11 J. LEGAL STUD.
139 (1982); Anthony J. Sebok, Misunderstanding Positivism, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2054 (1995).
What Lessig appears to mean is that code is law in the sense of being a law of a nature for
cyberspace. P. 70.
14. See STEVEN JOHNSON, INTERFACE CULTURE:
HOW NEW TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFORMS THE WAY WE CREATE AND COMMUNICATE (1997) ("All works of architec
ture imply a worldview, which means that all architecture is in some deeper sense politi
cal."); James Boyle, Foucault in Cyberspace: Surveillance, Sovereignty, and Hardwired Cen
sors, 66 U.CIN. L. REV. 177 (1997); Mitchell Kapor, The Software Design Manifesto (visited
June 23, 2000) <http://www.kei.com/homepages/mkapor/Software_Design_Manifesto.html>;
Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Pro
grams, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308 (1994).
15. P. 19. For a similar but non-normative definition, see p. 14 where Lessig states, "[b]y
'regulable' I mean simply that a certain behavior is capable of regulation."
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carries its source code along with the object code, modifications are
more easily possible. Lessig is an unabashed proponent of the open
source code movement, which he sees as revolutionary (p. 8). Open
code will make cyberspace less regulable because it puts coding in the
hands of more people, and, thus, code will be less subject to central
ized control.16 Lessig conceptualizes the situation in constitutional
terms. The citizenry will be safe from the tyranny of government only
if the awesome potential for power held by code is distributed broadly
among the programming world rather than concentrated in a small
number of hands.17
Lessig's overall argument is spread throughout the book's seven
teen chapters, which are divided into four parts. The main arguments
of Code, which will be the focus of this Review, are set out in Parts 1
and 2, entitled "Regulability," and "Code and Other Regulators."
Part 3, entitled "Applications," applies the arguments of Parts 1 and 2
to four important issues: intellectual property, privacy, free speech,
and sovereignty. Part 4, entitled "Responses," outlines responses to
actual and hypothetical objections to the book's main arguments.
Chapter One (as well as the Preface) provides a straightforward
overview of the book. In Chapter Two, Lessig introduces the book's
four themes and illustrates them by means of four stories; the themes
are 1) Regulability, 2) Regulation by Code, 3) Competing Sovereigns,
and 4) Latent Ambiguity.18 Lessig explains, "[m]y aim in the balance
of this book is to work through the issues raised by these four themes"
(p. 19). As Lessig says, he uses the four themes to "understand cyber
space as it is" and as "[he] believe[s] it is becoming" (p. 23).
Below, I first set out and evaluate the thirteen propositions
(positive and normative) which I argue provide a logical foundation to
Lessig's main themes. Since propositions are more specific than
Lessig's "themes" (propositions have truth values, themes do not), this
analytic device will facilitate clarity in the evaluation of the themes.

16. Seeinfra text accompanying notes 65-74. Though Lessig is understandably coy, the
implication for the Microsoft antitrust litigation is apparent. See United States v. Microsoft
Corp., 87
Supp. 2d 30 {D. D.C. 2000).

F.

17. Seep. 7 {"One part of this question of ownership is at the core of the current debate
between open and closed source software. In a way that the American founders would have
instinctively understood, 'free software' or 'open source software' - or 'open code'
is
itself a check on arbitrary power.").
.

.

.

18. Pp. 19-23. Note that the first two themes, "Regulability," and "Regulation by code,"
correspond to the first two parts of the book, "Regulability," and "Code and Other Regula
tors."

May 2000]
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BASIC PROPOSITIONAL STRUCTURE OF LESSIG'S ARGUMENT
The following set of propositions is meant to capture the intercon
necting structure of the core arguments implicit in Lessig's four
themes. In reading the propositions in the following summary form,
note that they fall into a logical sequence. This sequence is implicit in
the structure of Code. Lessig's themes "describe," rather than state
propositions. Hence, they do not have truth values and consequen
tially lack logical connectivity.19

1.
2.

Net95 was unregulable.20
Libertarians believe the Internet is unregulable by nature.

3. The Internet is regulable.
Therefore:

4.

Libertarians hold a faulty conception regarding the nature of
the Internet.

5. Code is the most important regulator of the Internet.

6. The Internet embodies values.
7. Liberty is an important value that ought to be respected and
promoted.
8. There is an inverse correlation between regulability and liberty.
Therefore:
9. The Internet is diminishing in its capacity to promote liberty.
Therefore:

10. The trend toward increased regulability of the Internet ought to
be reversed.
11. Open source code is less regulable than closed (proprietary)
source code.
Therefore:

12. Open source code ought to be promoted.
13. We Need An Internet Constitution
The three statements above that are italicized (numbers 7, 10, and
1 2) are "normative"-that is, "ought" statements, not "is" statements.
Hume's Law is sometimes stated as: An ought cannot be derived from

19. Themes "describe. " P. 8. Lessig's themes are nevertheless adaptive, as they make
the book more accessible to a wider audience, which is an important goal of the book.
Lessig says that his audience is second-generation netizens. P. xi.
20. For a definition and discussion of "Net95," see infra text accompanying note 22.
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Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 98:1916

an is.21 The proper conception of Hume's Law, however, is that an
ought statement cannot be derived merely from an is statement. Les
sig does not explicitly characterize his leading assertions as either posi
tive or normative. As we work through the set of propositions that
embody his argument, however, it will be important to pay attention
to the connections he draws between the "ises" and the "oughts."
In the following discussion, I evaluate, independently and then in
conjunction with each other, each of the thirteen propositions that to
gether constitute the core arguments of the book.
1.

Net95 was Unregulable

Lessig discusses what he refers to as "Net95," which is what the
Internet was like, circa 1995.22 The most significant feature of Net95
was that it was a world that could not be controlled. It is this Internet
that libertarians have in mind. Lessig sets out three structural ele
ments that were conspicuously absent in Net95. These are "creden
tials," "labels" and "zones" (p. 28). As Lessig notes, these elements
can either be seen as "features" or "imperfections," depending on
whether one favors increased regulability of the Internet (p. 27).
Net95 lacked information about users' identities (p. 28). By identi
fication, Lessig means all the true facts about a person, such as "your
name, your sex, where you live, what your education is, your driver's
license number . . ." (pp. 30-31). "Authentication" is the process by
which aspects of your identity become known (p. 31). Net95 did not
have an architecture that allowed people to authenticate personal facts
that are not self-authenticating.23 Some personal facts are self
authenticating. Lessig argues that in the physical world, many facts
are self-authenticating or easily authenticated. In cyberspace, how
ever, at least with regard to Net95, personal facts are not self
authenticating (pp. 32-33). For facts that are not self-authenticating,
21. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE, 1739-40 (L.A. Selby-Bigge &
P.H. Nidditch eds., 2d ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1978); see also R.M. HARE, MORAL
THINKING: ITS LEVELS, METHOD AND P OINT 16 (1981) (discussing " Hume's Law").
22. See pp.25-27. Lessig states that the computer network that previously existed at the
University of Chicago exemplifies Net95. P.27. He had direct acquaintance with this sys
tem, as he was teaching at the University of Chicago when this system was in place.
23. See p.31.
"Authentication" is the process by which aspects of your identity become known
If I
walk into a bank, the teller will know a Jot about me even if I don't say a thing: he will know
I'm a puffy, middle-aged white guy with glasses and blondish hair; he will know I'm not big
and not strong.... He will know all this whether I want to tell him or not
Hiding usually
does not hide itself very well; usually we reveal that we are hiding.
P. 31. Lessig gives the example of the University of Chicago system. The architecture re
quired no credentials; thus, it was "both easy to hide that you [were] a dog and hard to prove
that you were not." P.33.
•

. • . .

.

•

•
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Lessig argues that new architectures are quickly evolving on the Inter
net that will make them capable of authentication. These are "creden
tials." Lessig examines three forms of credentialing currently found
on the Internet, which are "passwords," "cookies," and "digital certifi
cates."24
A second feature that defined Net95 was an absence of labels.
While it is true that the packets of data that sail across the Internet are
labeled in the sense of having an Internet Protocol (IP) address,25 be
yond that, they could contain anything at all. Under Net95, there was
no system for obtaining verifiable information about the data on the
Net because such data traveled unlabeled.26
The third core feature of Net95 - the absence of zones - tied the
first two together. Because there was no simple way either to know
who someone was or to classify data, there was no simple way to make
access to data depend on who the user was, or on the data to which
she or he wanted access. As Lessig says, under Net95, there was "no
simple way to zone cyberspace."27
These three features in combination made Net95 largely unregula
ble, a dream telecosm by libertarian lights. Lessig accounts for this
lack of regulability as an unintended consequence of the early exigen-

24. Pp. 34-35. Each of these three credentials provides a means to identify someone on
the Internet. Typically, a "password" is a word or number that is kept secret. The user en
ters the password along with her account name in order to verify that the user is authori2ed
to use the system. Manufacturers are experimenting with biometric devices such as thumb
print readers and retina scanners to link particular individuals to particular machines. P. 57.
A "cookie" is a small bit of data entered by your browser to a "cookie file" on your hard
drive. Websites that you visit initiate these cookies so that when you return to the site, they
can recognize you because the cookie is sent by your browser to the website along with the
request for the site. Like the above two technologies, "digital certificates" serve to identify
you on the Internet. Digital certificates provide and certify more detailed information, how
ever, such as citi2enship, age, occupation, gender, etc.
25. IP addresses are the bits of data that allow packets of information to move from one
place to another on the Net. They look like this: 394.64.85.666. Basically, IP addresses
function like postal addresses, saying from where the packet is coming and to where the
packet is going.
26. See p. 28 ("Pictures of flesh come across a screen, but the system cannot tell whether
the pictures are medical photos or pornography. Data about bodily functions come across
the wire, but the system cannot tell whether the data are from medical records or a
novel . . .. Net95 had no requirement that data be labeled.").
27. P. 28 (emphasis omitted). Lessig argues that zoning techniques will lead to previously unimagined abilities to regulate the Web. He writes:
The effect, in short, would be to zone cyberspace based on the qualifications carried by
individual users. It would enable a degree of control of cyberspace that few have ever
imagined. Cyberspace would go from being an unregulable space to, depending on the
depth of the certificates in the space, the most regulable space imaginable.
P. 57 (emphasis omitted).
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cies of the largely research-oriented academic community that devel
oped the Internet.28
2.

Libertarians Believe the Internet is Unregulable by Nature

Chapter Three is entitled, "Is-isms," which, according to Lessig, is
the fallacy of thinking that because something is a certain way, it must
stay that way (p. 25). According to Lessig, this fallacy is widespread
among, indeed characteristic of, the Internet community when it
comes to their belief in the unregulability of the Internet (p. 4).
Lessig compares what he calls the "libertarian utopianism" of the Net
to what he found in Eastern Europe in the early 1990s.29 This commu
nity sees the Internet as an unregulated space, and implicitly thinks its
destiny is to remain that way.
3.

The Internet is Regulable

As mentioned earlier, Lessig's first theme is "regulability." As the
form of cognate chosen suggests, the book provides a discussion of
"regulability" understood so as to be applicable to systems. With re
gard to the Internet, Lessig argues that while the Internet was un
regulable in 1995, it is advancing rapidly toward a state of greater
regulability. Lessig explores in detail the great extent to which each of
the three features missing from Net95 can be laid onto the architecture
of the Internet as it currently exists. Lessig argues convincingly that it
will be in the interest of electronic commerce to code in all three of
these features, credentials, labels, and zones, in order to create more
sophisticated marketplaces in cyberspace (p. 42).
For the lay libertarians who peopled early cyberspace, the absence
of these three features made for a free and open electronic space in
which people could quietly come and go as they pleased. In this early
period, the Internet was noncommercial and without markets. For the
assembling titans of wired capitalism, however, the lack of credentials,
labels, and zones are serious obstacles to their business models and ac
cordingly must be overcome. Lessig argues that it is through tech
nologies of identification and authentication that users will be creden
tialed, and data credentialed and labeled, such that cyberspace will be
28. Seep. 33 ("This minimalism in design is intentional. It reflects both a political deci
sion about disabling control and a technological decision about the optimal network design.
The designers were not interested in advancing social control; they were concerned with
network efficiency. ").
29. Seep. 4 ("As in post-Communist Europe,first thoughts about cyberspace tied free
dom to the disappearance of the state. But here the bond was even stronger than in post
Communist Europe. The claim now was that government could not regulate cyberspace,
that cyberspace was essentially,and unavoidably,free.") (emphasis omitted).
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capable of being effectively zoned (p. 57). This process is already un
der way such that cyberspace becomes more regulable every day.30
Computer code provides the means to make the Internet more
regulable, and electronic commerce provides the incentive (p. 42).
Lessig argues that the commercial development of the Internet is cre
ating the main pressure pushing toward greater regulability. The
above three features of Net95 each facilitate electronic commerce.31
Therefore:

4.

Libertarians Hold a Faulty Conception Regarding
the Nature of the Internet

As just discussed, Lessig demonstrates that while it is true that the
Internet was unregulable in 1995, by the time he was completing the
book in 1999, the Net had become substantially more regulable (pp.
43-60). Libertarians, however, think that the Net is unregulable by na
ture (p. 5). If Net95 was unregulable and Net99 is becoming regulable,
then obviously the Net does not have an essential nature when it
comes to regulability. Libertarians who think otherwise are simply
wrong.
To evaluate the conclusion that Lessig draws in Proposition Four
(that the libertarians are wrong regarding regulability), it is necessary
to evaluate each of the premises-propositions one through three.
Proposition one, that Net95 was unregulable, is in need of qualifica
tion. Lessig defines regulability as the "capacity of a government to
regulate behavior within its proper reach" (p. 19). Note that this defi
nition makes no requirement that regulability come by means of com
puter code for advanced methods of identification and authentication
of the sort described by Lessig. In other words, regulability, as generi
cally understood, allows scope for low-tech means of regulability as
well as high-tech means of regulability.
Title II of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA") pro
vides a low tech means of increasing regulability.32 It creates safe har
bors from copyright liability for Internet Service Providers (ISPs).
Because ISPs play a leading role with regard to the Internet, creating
safe harbors for many of their activities is an important instance of
statutory regulation of the Internet. Yet, the means by which the safe
30. See Deborah M. Thaw, The Net Makes Notaries More Necessary, Not Less, Bus.
WK.,Dec.13,1999,at 18 (arguing that current business dealing demands identity assurance).
31. See p. 30 ("As the Net is being remade to fit the demands of commerce, architec
tures are being added to make it serve commerce more efficiently. Regulability will be a by
product of these changes. ").
32. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat.2860 (1998). Title II of the Act is known as the Online
Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act.
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harbor provisions work is low-tech, requiring none of the sophisticated
architectural devices discussed by Lessig. Thus, low-tech means of
Internet regulation may produce dramatic results in terms of regula
bility.33 Low-tech means of regulability of this sort were available un
der Net95. Hence, it is not the case that Net95 was unregulable.
Proposition one is incorrect.
Proposition two, which holds that libertarians think that the Net is
unregulable, is also in need of qualification. When Lessig talks about
libertarians, he is generally not referring to academic libertarians but
rather to the large and influential cohort within the Internet commu
nity who are libertarian in their political views regarding the Internet.34
With regard to this lay libertarian political community, Proposition
two is correct. Lessig is right that it has been, and remains, common
for Internet cognoscente to state that the Internet is not capable of
regulation. And many others, who do not go quite this far, neverthe
less maintain that government regulation of the Internet, while per
haps not impossible, is nevertheless a bad idea.
With regard to academic cyber-libertarianism, however, the picture
is more scrambled. David Post and David Johnson hold the view that
Lessig criticizes.35 Richard Epstein, however, explicitly distinguishes
33. In fact, each of the statutes produced by the U.S. Congress thus far to regulate the
Internet are best viewed as low-tech, non-code-based forms of regulation. See Anticyber
squatting Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1536, 1501A-545 {1999)
(codified as scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.A. & 16 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 2000)) [hereinafter
Anticybersquatting Act); No Electronic Theft ("NET") Act, Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat.
2678 {1997) (codified as scattered sections of 17 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C. (1994 & Supp.
III 1997)) [hereinafter NET Act); Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104104, § 509, 110 Stat. 133, 137-139 (1996) (codified as 47 U.S.C. § 230 (1994 & Supp. II 1996))
[hereinafter § 230 of the CDA). This is true as well with regard to recent efforts by other
countries, such as China, to regulate Internet use. The Chinese government recently stepped
up efforts to censor the content that appears on the screens of computers in China. The
government utilizes a variety of means to accomplish this result, many of which are distinctly
low-tech, such as threatening to imprison those who post proscribed content:
They routinely block Web sites for some international media outlets and are training special
police units to monitor Internet activity. Internet-cafe operators are charged with making
sure users don't "endanger national security" while online. A fin al line of defense is the low
tech, tried and true method of scaring users into policing themselves by making examples of
people who venture into banned territory. In December, a Shang hai court handed down a
two-year jail term to a software vendor, Lin Hai, who sold 30,000 Chinese e-mail addresses
to a U.S.-based online dissident journal.

Susan Lawrence, Beijing Mounts Great Leap Online, NAT'L POST, Mar. 3, 1999, available in
WESTLAW, 1999 WL 13666980.
34. See p. 85 & n.l (" 'Libertarian,' however, has a specific meaning for us. It associates
\vith arguments against government. " "Or more precisely, against a certain form of govern
ment regulation ( in cyberspace).").
35. Lessig begins Chapter Three with the following epigram, which he says exemplifies
the sort of libertarian view he has in mind: "The rise of an electronic medium that disre
gards geographical boundaries throws the law into disarray by creating entirely new phe
nomena that need to become the subject of clear legal rules but that cannot be governed,
satisfactorily, by any current territorially based sovereign. " P. 24 (quoting David R. Johnson
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his flavor of libertarianism from Lessig's characterization.36 We see
then that Proposition two is true for the lay-libertarian community but
only partially true for the academic-libertarian community.37
As already stated, Proposition three is correct, the Net is indeed
becoming more regulable. The question then is whether the conclu
sion stated in Proposition four follows from Propositions one through
three, once Propositions one and two have been qualified. The answer
is yes. While Net95 was not unregulable in the broad sense indicated
by Lessig's definition of regulability, it was nevertheless difficult to
regulate (or regulable only·in a perhaps less effective low-tech sense),
so Proposition one is close to true. And most, if not all, libertarians
mistakenly thought the Net's unregulability was an immutable feature.
So Proposition two is substantially true as well. Since Proposition
three is correct in holding that the Internet is regulable, it follows that
libertarians have an incorrect conception regarding the regulability of
the Internet.
The conclusion Lessig draws in Proposition four is both logically
valid and true. Lessig is not interested in making this point for its own
sake. His larger concern is to argue that the common libertarian mis
conception is dangerous, as blindness to the problem entails inatten
tion to the problem. Lessig writes,
"Let the Net take care of itself," is the slogan of our generation - and
the current administration. But if we do, then the Net will become some
thing very different from what it is just now. That's the argument of my
book. Not an attack on ivory-tower Libertarianism. Nor even an attack

& David Post, Law and Borders- The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L.

REV. 1367,

1375 {1996)).
36. See Epstein, supra note 10, 'JI 5 ("Rather, the libertarian is someone whose objective
function starts with the goal of minimizing the use of force and fraud in human interac
tions
[T]he libertarian is not an anarchist").
.

.

•

.

37. In his subsequent exchange with Richard Epstein in Slate magazine, Lessig provides
the following helpful summary of competing libertarian conceptions.
But there is "libertarianism" in the ivory tower and there is "libertarianism" on the ground.
I recognize the species that Richard describes; I am a permanent resident of the ivory tower.
But my book describes a present political attitude, not the ivory tower. It is about a present
political reality, and a present rhetorical push. I am describing it because I have been
watching it for the past six years. In that world, if someone argued (as Richard does above)
that a "law of privacy" was needed, as well as law protecting trade secrets; that laws regu
lating libel and slander were necessary, as well as a law regulating blackmail; if one even
raised the issue of taxation, or suggested that the government was needed to "secure the in
frastructure," then one would not be a "libertarian." One would be a Red. The libertarian
of the Net has a simple message, quite different from ivory-tower libertarianism. It is: Keep
the government out

See Lessig, Real-World Libertarians and the Net, supra note 10, 'J[ 7.
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on "sensible libertarianism." But an attack on a certain do-nothingness
that pervades our present political culture.38

Lessig's argument and conclusion here are important.

5.

Code is the Most Important Regulator of the Internet

The second "theme" of the book is "regulation by code." Lessig
states that this second theme should be considered in conjunction with
Theme one, "regulability." In Lessig's words, "the regulability de
scribed by the first theme depends on the code described in the sec
ond" (p. 20; emphasis omitted). Lessig nestles this account of regula
tion by code within a more general account of social regulation.39
Lessig identifies four main forces affecting social regulation: law,
markets, norms, and architecture (p. 88). Lessig says we should think
of each as a distinct modality of regulation (p. 88). What the modali
ties have in common is that each serves as a "constraint" on behavior
(p. 88). Laws constrain behavior by making certain activities illegal (p.
89). Markets constrain by making certain behaviors more expensive
(p. 89). Norms constrain by making certain behaviors subject to in
formal yet often potent social sanctions (p. 235). Finally, code (archi
tecture) constrains behavior by creating architectural structures that
constrain behavior (pp. 89-90).
In cyberspace, code is the most important regulator (p. 86). As
Lessig says, in the late twentieth century and into the twenty-first, it is
code that should be our concern (p. 86). While the role of code is sali
ent as never before, it is not Lessig's argument that we focus exclu
sively on code. Rather, we need to implement a more general under
standing of how regulation works, one that accounts for the
increasingly important role played by code.40
Code is an important regulator in cyberspace for the obvious but
profound reason that code is what provides the raw material out of
which cyberspace is built. Cyberspace simply would not exist without
this code. Hume famously refers to causation as the cement of the
universe.41 Picking up on this, Jon Bister refers to social norms as the
cement of society.42 For Lessig, code is the cement of cyberspace. In
38. Lessig,Real-World Libertarians and the Net, supra note 10, 'll'll 8-9.
39. Lessig develops this account more fully in the appendix to the book. See pp. 235-39.
40. In Chapter 7, in which Lessig Jays out his account of social regulation, he provides a
number of diagrams that are meant to capture the individual persons buffeted about by the
four forces impinging from all four directions. In the center of these forces, the individual is
represented by a "dot. " Curiously,Lessig refers to the dots (us) as "pathetic." P. 86.
41. DAVID HUME, AN ABSTRACT OF A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 32 (1740) (re
printed with an introduction by J.M. Keynes and P. Staffa, Cambridge University Press
1938).

42. See generally ELSTER, supra note 7.
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fact, as Lessig reminds us, there is not one cyberspace possible but
many, and the constitutive difference is code.43

6.

The Internet Embodies Values

According to Lessig, not only does code provide the raw materials,
it also determines the normative character of cyberspace. One of the
most important features of architectural code is that it is not value
neutral. To the contrary, different architectures promote different
values. Lessig writes, "[w]hat distinguishes different parts of cyber
space are the differences in the regulations effected through code. In
some places life is fairly free, in other places controlled, and the dif
ference between them is simply a difference in the architectures of
control - that is, a difference in code" (p. 20).
One of the distinctive features of architectural code as a regulator
is that it may promote or stifle values in a relatively invisible manner.
Just as Robert Moses could use the height of highway overpasses to
keep city buses (and, therefore, African Americans) away from the
beaches of Long Island, so too, code writers can create architectures
that have significant policy implications in peoples' lives.44 Lessig dis
cusses a number of different sub-regions of cyberspace in order to
show how values may be implicit in different architectural structures.
Lessig compares the computer networks at the University of
Chicago and Harvard University. Chicago's network was explicitly
chosen to promote First Amendment free speech values. The network
designers asked the Provost if the network should build in identifica
tion architecture (p. 26). The Provost, First Amendment scholar
Geoffrey Stone, chose instead to promote free speech values by
building anonymity into the system.45 By contrast, Harvard chose to
disallow anonymity by requiring that members of the university com
munity register their machines.46

43. P. 82 ("[C]yberspace is not a place; it is many places. Its places don't have one na
ture; the places of cyberspaces have many different 'natures.' These natures are not given,
they are made . . . . These architectures are themselves not given; these architectures of code
are set by the architects of cyberspace - code writers.").
44. Seep.92 & n.9 (citing ROBERT A. CARO, THE POWER BROKER: ROBERT MOSES
ANDTHEFALLOFNEWYORIC318 (1974)).
45. Seep. 83 ("At the University of Chicago, if you wanted access to the Internet, you
simply connected your machine to jacks located throughout the university. Any machine
with an Ethernet connection could be plugged into these jacks. Once connected, your ma
chine had full access to the Internet - access, that is, that was complete, anonymous, and
free." (footnote omitted)).
46. Seep.26 ("You cannot connect your machine to the net at Harvard unless the ma
chine is registered - licensed, approved, verified ... . Once registered, all interactions with
the network are monitored and identified to a particular machine ....").
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Lessig pays the most attention to the space owned by America
Online ("AOL"). Like Walt Disney before him, AOL CEO, Steve
Case, seeks to provide an environment in which the values that his or
ganization favors may flourish. AOL has a number of architectural
features that are relevant to the values that adhere in its space. Each
AOL account is allowed five screen names (p. 67). This architectural
feature promotes anonymous, indeed pseudonymous, online activity.
As Lessig notes, anonymity may promote political expression (pp. 7073). AOL's chat rooms, however, have a maximum of twenty-four
participants, and, thus, it is not possible for members to address other
members en masse.47 In addition, AOL has a general code of conduct
that constrains certain sorts of behavior such as obscenity (p. 67).
Consider next the online service Counsel Connect. The ninety or
so discussion groups that comprise Counsel Connect each have discus
sion leaders (p. 72). By contrast to AOL, however, these discussion
leaders do not have the ability to cancel postings (p. 72). Thus, Coun
sel Connect is more respectful of free speech than is AOL. Another
distinct feature is that with Counsel Connect, the lawyer participants
must use their real names (p. 73). The use of real names allows par
ticipants to develop reputations, such as the reputation as a good law
yer to whom another lawyer would refer business (p. 73).
Finally, consider the values that may be instantiated in MUDs and
MOOs.48 LamdaMOO is one of the older more well-established
MOOs. It is a text-based virtual reality that is linked to over 5000
members from around the world. Upon entry into this virtual com
munity, one is assigned a character, which can then build a life in this
community.
Communities survive particular interactions, which
means that characters may develop reputations through their behavior
in various settings. Thus, in LamdaMOO, people are anonymous (like
AOL) but can develop reputations (like Counsel Connect).49

47. See p. 68 ("There is no town hall or town meeting where people can complain in
public and have their complaints heard by others. There is no space large enough for citi
zens to create a riot. The owners of AOL, however, can speak to all. Steve Case, the "town
mayor," writes "chatty" letters to the members.").
48. A MUD is typically defined as a multi-user dungeon or multi-user domain. A MOO
is an object-oriented MUD See generally SHERRY TURKLE, LIFE ON THE SCREEN:
IDENTITY IN THE AGE OF THE INTERNET (1995).
.

49. See Jennifer L. Mnookin, Virtual(ly) Law: The Emergence ofLaw in LambdaMOO,
2 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 1 (1996) <http://www.ascusc.org/jcmc/vol2/issue1/
lambda.html>.
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Liberty is an Important Value that Ought to be
Respected and Promoted

Lessig clearly holds liberty to be an important value. He does not
explicitly provide normative arguments to this effect, however, but
rather assumes it to be so. This assumption is reasonable, given that
Lessig is interested in studying the effects of increased regulability on
fundamental values. Liberty certainly is a fundamental value, the
word itself appearing in both the Declaration of Independence and the
Constitution.50
Nor does Lessig provide explicit arguments to support the norma
tive conclusion that liberty ought to be respected and promoted.
Given the moral logic of value statements, however, Lessig is justified
to make this assumption, for to hold that a value is a value, is, other
things equal, to hold that the value ought to be respected and pro
moted. This is simply the meaning of holding a value.

8.

There is an Inverse Correlation Between Regulability and Liberty

A related theme of the book is that increased regulability will
result in decreased liberty. Again, Lessig does not say much that di
rectly establishes this point. Perhaps it simply seems obvious. Alter
natively, he may see this proposition naturally following his concep
tion of regulation, which is defined in terms of constraints (p. 217).
More regulability means more constraints, which, by definition, means
less freedom, as freedom is reasonably construed as an absence of
constraints.51
Therefore:

9.

The Internet is Diminishing in its Capacity to Promote Liberty

The logic of Lessig's argument, then, is that because electronic
commerce is leading to increased regulability, and because increased
regulability causes a loss of liberty, electronic commerce is causing the
Internet to be a less free place. The argument has a proper form.
Hence, unless one or more of the premises is false, Lessig's important
conclusion should be accepted.
Let us begin with Proposition five, which holds that code is the
most important regulator of cyberspace. This is an overstatement.

50. U.S. CONST.preamble & amend. V; THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para.2
(U.S. 1776).
51. While his focus is on liberty, Lessig contends that increased regulability will have an
adverse impact on other values as well. He writes, "Perfect authentication would mean that
others know for certain all the facts about you; happiness comes from others knowing a good
deal less." P. 31.
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Lessig does indeed provide strong reason to believe that code is an
important regulator. He does not, however, say anything that would
establish that it is the most important regulator. In particular, he does
not pay attention to important non-architectural means of regulating
the Internet, such as Title II of the DMCA and the other Internet
related statutes cited earlier, none of which regulates computer code.s2
There is no reason to think that traditional methods of regulation,
such as those recently employed by the American and Chinese gov
ernments, will not continue to be the predominant means to regulate
cyberspace.s3 Given this fact, one is not compelled to accept the claim
that code is the most important regulator of cyberspace without more
evidence or argument.
Proposition six holds that the Internet embodies values. This bare
proposition is uncontroversially true. Lessig's subtle discussion of the
various contexts in which this is true serves, however, to highlight the
importance of this claim, as the more we understand how the Internet
embodies values, the better position we will be in to shape these val
ues.
Proposition seven holds that liberty is an important value that
ought to be respected and promoted. While some moral theories
would reject this proposition, most mainstream moral theories indeed
recognize the central importance of liberty, although there will of
course be disagreement on whether liberty is ultimately grounded con
sequentially or deontologically.s4 Thus, Proposition seven is not in
need of qualification.
Proposition eight holds that there is an inverse correlation between
regulability and liberty. This premise is subject to question. The pur
ported inverse correlation appears to be based on the claim that, as a
general matter, the less e-commerce entities know about you the bet
ter off you will be.ss While this claim is not analytically true, there are
indeed many instances in which the possession of your information by

52 See supra text accompanying notes 32-33.
53. See supra note 33.
54. See generally JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY {Currin V. Shields ed., Bobbs
Merrill Co.1956) {1859) {classic consequentialist defense of liberty); IMMANUE L KANT, THE
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS {Mary Gregor trans. & ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996) {1797)
{classic deontological defense of liberty). Nothing Lessig says in the book indicates conclu
sively whether he is a consequentialist or deontologist. Some of his remarks indicate sensi
tivity to welfarist concerns. See pp. 146-47. Generally speaking, however, the preoccupation
with liberty and freedom sounds in deontology, as these are typically non-instrumentalist
values by the lights of mainstream moral and political theory. It is reasonable to assume,
then, that Lessig is some sort of deontologist who places great importance on the value of
liberty. What is not clear is whether he is the sort of deontologist who thinks duties and
rights can be traded off against consequentialist considerations, even if the former are not
reducible to the latter.
55. See supra note 51.
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others can hinder individual freedom. The most significant single ex
ample along these lines is Julie Cohen's argument that loss of the abil
ity to read anonymously threatens the core First Amendment value of
freedom of conscience and thought.56
The relationship between regulability and freedom is more com
plex, however, than is suggested by Lessig's analysis. While it is true
that you may be harmed by others' possession of your data, you may
also be helped. Code would benefit from a discussion of the consumer
surplus that may accrue to society due to increased regulability.57 For
example, casual empirical observation supports the claim that many
people are happy to exchange personal information for benefits re
ceived in return. Grocery stores that offer discounts for card holders
have no trouble establishing card-holder relationships despite the fact
that this bargain entails the release of purchasing data to the store's
sophisticated personal data-tracking system. Many people are quite
happy to take part in this particular market in personal data.58 It
would be odd to contend that people who choose to do so are some
how less free than those who choose not to.59 Freedom is measured in
your ability to choose, not in what you choose.60

56. See Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at "Copyright
Management" in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981, 1012 {1996) ("The freedom to read
anonymously is just as much a part of our tradition, and the choice of reading materials just
as expressive of identity, as the decision to use or withhold one's name."). In discussing the
"Cohen Theorem," Lessig offers an example from when he was a student at an English uni
versity. While there, he made several purchases of Scotch as gifts. When he returned to
school, a tutor asked him about his excessive purchasing of alcohol. Pp. 138-39 ("[N]ow that
monitoring can occur, we must ask whether the latent right to read anonymously, given to us
before by imperfections in technologies should be a legally protected right.").
!
57. Note that the benefits need not be consequentialist goods whose benefit comes at
the expense of liberty. One's access to online media may make one more enlightened, more
autonomous, and, hence, freer.
58. See Computer-Dating the Customer, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 4, 1995 at R7.
The bare fact that this practice exists does not show that it is efficient, however, as there
may be market failure. While there may be market failure, there also may not be market
failure. Lessig does not discuss which of these possibilities is more likely to be true.
59. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 931, 932 {1985) (noting that "unencumbered market trades are desirable
unless we can locate a valid reason for their restriction"); see also Michael A. Heller, The
Boundaries ofPrivate Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1199-1201 {1999) {discussing the role of
restrictions on restraint of alienability).
Are Americans, in general, freer now than they were a hundred years ago? Even if this
question is meaningful, the answer is certainly unclear. The answer would not be unclear,
however, if there was a direct correlation between Joss of informational privacy and Joss of
freedom, because we have dramatically less informational privacy than we had a century
ago.
60. See generally GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY
{1988).
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It will not be an adequate response to note that people trade away
their data out of ignorance of the consequences. While this is no
doubt true, it is also true that people not ignorant in this manner trade
away their data. Lessig himself trades away data by his acceptance of
cookies in his web browser.61 Plausibly, this shows that Lessig prefers
the benefits he gets from unrestricted Internet browsing over the con
sequent loss to his informational privacy. While it is true that unless
one provides some data, many interesting websites will be inaccessible,
this does not make the provision of data in these circumstances any
more coercive than when one is required to pay admission to enter a
movie or ball game. 62
Lessig implicitly acknowledges the potential compatibility between
liberty and regulability in the chapter entitled "Privacy" in Part Three
of the book, in which he applies the book's earlier arguments in par
ticular contexts. Lessig promotes a regime of user self-help to secure
Internet privacy, such as might be supplied by emerging technologies
such as P3P (p. 160). P3P allows client browsers to perform automatic
electronic negotiations with websites, based on the privacy preferences
of the user and the privacy policies of the website. Such transactions
have the potential to make both users and websites better off.
We see, then, that on one plausible conception of freedom, the
contractarian model, consumers may express their free desires when
they bargain into a situation of increased regulability. This means that
there is not a simple inverse correlation between regulability and free
dom. Greater regulability may just mean an architecture that allows
for more and better opportunities for bargaining.63 Accordingly, the
conclusion as stated in Proposition nine, that cyberspace is diminishing
liberty, is not established. Nor has the negation of this proposition
been established. More study into the relationship between regulabil
ity and liberty is needed.

61. See supra note 24; pp. 41-42 ("With one click, you can disable the deposit of cook
ies .... [b]ut this privacy comes at a cost. Users who choose this option are either unable to
use areas of the Net where cookies are required or forced constantly to choose whether a
cookie will be deposited. Most find the hassle too great and simply accept cookies on their
machine.").
62. Currently, much personal data gathering by websites is not conducted pursuant to
consensual bargains. Rather, many websites either collect data without notice or use the
data in a manner that is beyond the scope of the agreement. See Steven Hetcher, The FTC
as Privacy Norm Entrepreneur, 53 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming2000).
63. In a free and fair market, for example, people may choose to carry digital credentials
in order to conduct the sort of electronic commerce functions that are facilitated by these
credentials.
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10. The Trend Toward Increased Regulability of the Internet
Ought to be Reversed
From the above set of propositions, Lessig draws a second norma
tive conclusion. By combining the premise that liberty is a fundamen
tal value that ought to be respected and promoted with the premise
that cyberspace is becoming less free due to increased regulability,
Lessig concludes that the trend toward increased regulability ought to
be reversed (pp. 52, 56, 108).64
By the lights of the discussion in the previous section, however, it
should be clear that this conclusion does not follow because the prem
ise holding that increased regulability leads to decreased freedom has
not been established. Thus, it may not be necessary to reverse the
trend toward greater regulability in order to promote liberty. What
matters in terms of promoting liberty is that future states of greater
regulability are the result of autonomous processes.
11. Open Source Code is Less Regulable than Closed
(Proprietary) Source Code
Lessig argues that open code will be less subject to regulability
than proprietary code.65 Lessig claims that open source code will
make top-down control harder but will allow for bottom-up control (p.
20). Lessig's argument for why open code will promote unregulability
and hence liberty is simple but powerful. The basic idea is that impor
tant proprietary code will likely be owned by large commercial entities
who will be easily susceptible to governmental attempts to alter code
to serve governmental interests.66 Lessig gives the example of
64. Depending on the underlying value theory one assumes, the fact that liberty is an
important value will not be enough to draw any necessary practical inferences solely based
on the existence of a serious threat to liberty. The reason is that by the lights of prominent
and respected theories, a diminution in liberty may be morally permissible if it is the result
of some moral or policy choice that pursues a distinct sort of benefit or sorts of benefits that,
all things considered, balances out the liberty concern. If the proper normative account re
quires trade-offs, then Lessig must countenance the possibility that a diminution in liberty is
justified by the fact that the proposed state of affairs promotes other values. This is more
than a theoretical possibility, if we are to judge based on the current growth in the market in
personal data, a significant and growing part of which is occurring pursuant to consensual
practices. See Hetcher, supra note 62. Lessig has to respect the fact that mainstream Inter
net users today may not pine after Net95 the way that first-generation users did. Freedom
may simply mean the autonomy to indulge even more conspicuously in the fatuous materi
alism that constitutes much of contemporary American life.

65. P. 107 ("To the extent that code is open code, the power of government is con
strained .... [W]hen the target of its regulation is plastic, it cannot rely on its target re
maining as it wants.").
66. P. 52 ("But as code writing becomes commercial - as it becomes the product of a
smaller number of large companies - the government 's ability to regulate it increases.").
Lessig also writes "[t]he code is regulable only because the code writers can be con-

1936

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 98:1916

Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of

1994

("CALEA"),67 the statute that forced phone companies to build in a
backdoor to allow for governmental eavesdropping of digital tele
phone lines (pp. 44-45, 106).
Contrast this example of easy regulation of proprietary code with
the results of a government attempt to create a backdoor into open
code. Lessig provides an example involving Netscape (p. 106). The
French government tried to get Netscape to alter its SSL encryption
technology to allow a backdoor for police.68 Because Netscape had
made its source code public, however, it was pointless to comply with
the French request (p. 106). Even if Netscape released a new module
that was compliant, because the source code was open, other vendors
would soon supply SSL without the modifications. In other words, be
cause SSL is open source code, it is not easily regulable. Accordingly,
open code deters censorship and, thus, promotes freedom. Lessig ar
gues that this example is indicative of a general fact that it is much
more difficult to regulate open code systems. Lessig's claim here is
both significant and plausible.
Lessig sees open code as providing a "structural guarantee of con
stitutionalized liberty" (p. 7). According to Lessig, open code "func
tions as a type of separation of powers in the American Constitutional
tradition" (p. 7). This remark may at first appear puzzling because
code does not perform a separation of powers in the usual sense. The
Constitution is conventionally understood to separate power in two
fundamental respects: first, between the states and the federal gov
ernment, and second, between the branches of the federal govern
ment. 69 Apparently, what Lessig has in mind is a separation of powers
between governmental and nongovernmental social forces, in other
words, between social norms and law. We see in this discussion how
Lessig's four-part account of regulation and social order allows him to
put meat on the bones of the concept of a British-style constitution for
America.
Therefore:

trolled . . . . An unmovable, and unmoving, target of regulation, then, is a good start to
regulability. And this statement has an interesting corollary: regulable code is closed code."
P. 106.
67. Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act {CALEA), Pub. L. No. 103414, 108 Stat. 4279 {1994) (codified as amended at 18 U.S. C. §2522 (1994) and 47 U.S. C. §§
229, 1001-1010 (1994 & Supp. II 1996)).
68. SSL is Netscape's protocol for exchanging encrypted data between the client's
browser and the host's server.
69. See Rayburn's Case,2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792).
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12. Open Source Code Ought to be Promoted
Because open source code is less regulable than closed source
code, and regulability is inversely related to liberty, and liberty is a
value that ought to be promoted, open source code ought to be pro
moted.70 Subject to the qualifications noted above about the relation
ship between regulability and liberty, this is a valid argument, which
moves from plausible premises to a plausible conclusion. And given
how high the stakes are - liberty in cyberspace - an important con
clusion as well.
13.

We Need An Internet Constitution

Encouraging open source code is Lessig's main concrete prescrip
tion for promoting a constitutional regime for cyberspace that respects
and promotes liberty.71 Lessig provides little by way of detail as to
how a world of open source code might be accomplished. Unfortu
nately for his reader, Lessig may be precluded from doing so by a con
flict of interest, as such a discussion could hardly fail to discuss Micro
soft. Lessig does not discuss the Microsoft antitrust litigation that was
ongoing at the time of the publication of the book. This is appropriate
and expected given Lessig's ongoing role in the litigation.72
There is a deep tension between open code and Microsoft's busi
ness model, which is that its software runs the world.73 Microsoft's
business model is precisely that there not be open source code but
rather that the dominant (or exclusive) code of cyberspace be a pro
prietary Microsoft product. While the remark is often made offhand,
it does, indeed, appear that Bill Gates wants to control cyberspace.74
Lessig wants no one to control cyberspace.75
70. See p. 8 ("Guarantee the structural (a space in cyberspace for open code), and (much
of) the substance will take care of itself."). Lessig argues that we should strive for a "com
mons" in the core code of the Internet P. 141.
71. See p. 7 ("If the code of cyberspace is owned (in a sense that I describe in the book),
it can be controlled; if it is not owned, control is much more difficult. The lack of ownership,
the absence of property, the inability to direct how ideas will be used - in a word, the pres
ence of a commons - is key to limiting, or checking, certain forms of government control.").
72. P. 8. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Amicus Brief on Technological Tying (211100).

73. See p. 105 ("Microsoft may have imagined in 1995 that by 2000 there would be no
other server operating system available except Windows NT, but when 2000 came around,
there was GNU/Linux.").
74. See Laura Evenson, Gates to the Future: Microsoft Founder Outlines the World and
How He'll Run It, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 23, 1995, at Cl.
75. Richard Epstein has argued that open and proprietary codes can easily coexist
Epstein draws a parallel with the manner in which public highways easily coexist with gated
communities. This is a very important issue. If a multicode world is the future, then
Microsoft presents less of a threat than if a monocode world is likely instead. Epstein, supra
note 10, Jan. 19 posting, 'l!'ll 2-4.
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Lessig argues that, in order to systematically and democratically
deal with issues such as open code, we need to enter a period of consti
tution building. Lessig recommends that we create a constitution for
cyberspace.76 Recall that for Lessig, the word "constitution" is to be
understood in the British not the American sense. On this definition,
constitution building involves both governmental and nongovernmen
tal action.
On the broad account of constitution, then, what Lessig is really
saying is that we would do well to implement a justified social order
for cyberspace. Considered first at this general level, this claim is
highly plausible. Disagreement will come when we begin to fill in the
detail as to what in particular the constitutional order should look like.
Lessig does not provide details as to what the overarching features of
this order should be. Doing so would be an entire project in itself.
Lessig's main point is preliminary to this discussion. Before creating a
constitution, there must first be the recognition that one is needed.
This is the story of Code.
The reader comes away unclear on whether Lessig is proposing
that the constitutional order grow out of the U.S. legal system or in
stead that it evolve as a form of world government. Throughout the
book, Lessig uses the term "we." It appears that "we" means we
Americans. Does this mean that we Americans are supposed to create
the constitution for cyberspace? This is problematic, of course, as the
Internet is global.
Lessig suggests that we should choose to develop a new constitu
tion for this space, just as the American Founders and Russians had to
(pp. 4-8). But there are already constitutions in place that pertain to
cyberspace. China just announced rules to govern its space.77 Despite
the fact that the official U.S. policy is to support industry self
regulation, the United States has been regulating the Internet.78 While
early attempts at regulating the Internet may have been unsuccessful,
it is unlikely that this will cause the United States to cease trying. This
may make the issue of founding a new social order to govern the
Internet beside the point. In the United States alone, regulation of the

76. Lessig thinks it is natural and proper that the state should play an integral role in the
process of constitution building in cyberspace. This will probably strike the typical reader of
this Review as uncontroversial, but the crowd that Lessig most wants to convince on this par
ticular point is not constituted of the readers of this Review but rather the influential liber
tarian contingent of the Internet policy community. These are libertarians staunchly op
posed to all state involvement. Seesupra note 34.
77. Seesupra note 33.
78. See, e.g., Anticybersquatting Act, supra note 33; NET Act, supra note 33; § 230 of
the CDA, supra note 33; DMCA, supra note 32. These statutes are operative only because
they pass muster under the U.S. Constitution.
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Internet has arguably moved past the point where a founding of a new
order could be possible.
Nor does the broad need for a justified social order for cyberspace
entail the desirability of new constitutional amendments or federal
statutes.
Indeed, a grundnorm of the Internet has been self
regulation. Lessig is right that there is no necessary reason to prefer
informal social solutions. Nevertheless, informal solutions have a sig
nificant role to play. Lessig is also right that anarcho-libertarianism is
overly antigovernment in allowing no role for the government. The
government plays a fundamental role in providing legal order. Legal
order, however, is only one aspect of social order.
Lessig argues that the Constitution is thin; it does not adequately
stretch to cyberspace (p. 22). Two brief responses are worth men
tioning, although the topic merits greater discussion than can be pur
sued here. The first is that the bare fact that there are examples in
which the U.S. Constitution does not apply snugly to Internet facts is
certainly not enough reason to conclude that the larger U.S. legal sys
tem is not capable of dealing with the Internet. In particular, common
law processes have done reasonably well so far in adapting to the
Internet.79 So has the FTC, which has recently fostered industry self
regulation regarding website provision of privacy policies.80 Second,
there has not been enough time to tell. For example, the FTC had
made clear that it thinks more time is needed with respect to self
regulatory efforts regarding informational privacy online.81
Lessig does not point out that open source code is currently being
driven by commercial entities.82 While open code may be highly desir
able, it may still be the case, then, that the best provider of it is the
market and norms, not the state.

CONCLUSION
Climbing the walls of your electronic cage is what you will be doing
if the near dystopia which Lessig foretells in his important new book,

79. See, e.g., Compuserve v. Cyberpromotions, 962 F. Supp. 1015 (1997) (applying tres
pass theory in context of unsolicited electronic mail).
80. In its 1999 Report to Congress, the FTC notes that there has been significant im
provement in website provision of privacy policies. MARTHA LANDESBERG & LAURA
MAZZARELLA, FEDERAL TRADE COMM 'N, SELF-REGULATION AND PRIVACY ONLINE: A
REPORT TO CONGRESS (1999) (visited July 5, 2000) <ltttp://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/9907/
privacy99.pdf>. In its most recent Report to Congress, the FTC recommends fairly minimal
regulations, along with its continued support of industry self-regulation.
81. Seeid.
82 See, e.g., "Red Hat Reinforces Commitment to Open Source, Releases Source Code
for Popular Source-Navigator lOE" (press release) available at <ltttp://www.redhat.com/
about/2000/press_sourcemav.html>.
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Code, comes to pass. In this world, the Internet is a central and perva
sive fact of people's lives, and it is no longer free. Liberty has been
coded away. Your options, choices, and movement are heavily re
stricted, due to unprecedented levels of social regulation, made possi
ble by the awesome efficiencies of the Internet. In the encoded dysto
pia that Lessig predicts, you will be wired, but feeling wired in.
The issues Lessig raises are new and important. Thus, while one
can take issue with Lessig on various points, the book on the whole
nevertheless provides a compelling account that is intentionally scary.
Lessig seeks to scare because he is on a mission to deflect the
trajectory of modem techno-society from its current path. His book
demands attention and demands attention now because the changes
Lessig describes are radical and are happening in Internet time.

